We will not discuss the numerous violations here. Only the facts.
The Civil Contract party received 49.8% of the vote, while its closest rival — Samvel Karapetyan’s “Strong Armenia” bloc — received around 23%. Turnout approached 60%, one of the highest in recent years. Let’s break down why this happened.
Armenian Voters Did Not Place All the Blame for Karabakh on Pashinyan
These were the first elections since the final loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Many observers expected this to lead to the government’s defeat.
However, a significant part of society came to the opposite conclusion: the problem was not only in the actions of Pashinyan’s government, but also in the failure of the previous security system, which was based on the alliance with Russia. After the Karabakh crisis, trust in Moscow as a guarantor of Armenia’s security dropped significantly. That is why the opposition’s slogan about returning to the old model of relations with Russia failed to unite the majority of voters.
Pashinyan Offered a Clear Vision for the Future
Pashinyan was the only major politician who proposed not a revanchist agenda, but a strategy for the future: a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, the opening of transport corridors, normalization of relations with Turkey, integration with the EU, and attracting Western investment.
For a significant portion of voters, this seemed a more realistic scenario than promises to restore lost influence or revise the results of the Karabakh war.
The Opposition Turned Out to Be Fragmented
Even before the vote, analysts noted that Pashinyan’s opponents had failed to form a united front. In addition to Karapetyan’s bloc, other opposition forces also entered parliament, competing with each other for the same electorate.
As a result, the three main pro-Russian forces together gained about 37% of the vote but ran separately. This allowed the ruling party to maintain a confident lead.
Anti-Russian Mobilization Proved Stronger Than Expected
The elections effectively became a vote on the country’s foreign policy direction.
During the campaign, there was active discussion of Russian restrictions on Armenian imports, warnings about possible gas price revisions, and accusations of attempts to influence the elections. Consequently, many voters saw the vote as a chance to support a more independent course for Armenia.
Samvel Karapetyan Failed to Broaden His Support Base
Despite a solid result, Karapetyan remained largely the candidate of the protest and pro-Russian electorate.
On the one hand, his house arrest allowed him to portray himself as a victim of political persecution. On the other hand, for many voters his image was too closely associated with Russian political and economic influence — something that now elicits a mixed reaction in Armenian society.
High Turnout Worked in Favor of the Authorities
One of the surprises was the nearly 60% turnout. The opposition hoped that high mobilization would help consolidate the protest vote. However, the results showed that supporters of the current prime minister also came out actively.
In effect, Pashinyan managed to turn the elections into a vote not about the past, but about the future of the country. This is what allowed him to win nearly half of all votes, even after the most severe foreign policy crisis in modern Armenian history.
Pashinyan won not because the majority of Armenians fully support his policies, but because a significant part of society considered his course less risky than a return to the old, Russia-oriented model. The elections became more a vote for peaceful settlement and predictability than unconditional approval of the current government’s actions. At the same time, the opposition’s result (37% for pro-Russian parties) shows that Armenian society remains deeply divided, and the political struggle after the elections is unlikely to become less intense.
